The recent ban on Jamaat-e-Islami (Jamaat) and its student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir (Shibir), marks a significant turning point in the political history of Bangladesh. While the ruling Awami League (AL) touts the ban as a victory for secularism and a step towards eradicating radicalism, a closer analysis suggests that this move may have more complex and far-reaching implications. Not only does it alter the political dynamics, but it also challenges the AL's long-standing strategy of using Jamaat as a convenient scapegoat for various societal and political issues.
The Context
Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, previously known as Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh, is the largest Islamist political party in Bangladesh.
Its predecessor, Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan, strongly opposed the independence of Bangladesh and collaborated with the Pakistan Army during the 1971 Liberation War.
Paramilitary forces associated with Jamaat, such as the Razakars, Al-Badr, and Al-Shams, were involved in mass killings of Bangladeshi nationalists and intellectuals. This historical baggage has made Jamaat a polarizing force in Bangladeshi politics.
Upon Bangladesh's independence in 1971, Jamaat was banned from political participation, and many of its leaders went into exile. Following the assassination of the first president and the military coup in 1975, the ban was lifted, and Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh was formed. The party's agenda included the creation of an "Islamic state" governed by Sharia law.
Despite being a controversial entity, Jamaat participated in the democratic process and formed alliances with major political parties like the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and, at times, the Awami League.
The government's decision to ban Jamaat and its front organizations was taken under the Anti-Terrorism Act-2009, citing their involvement in terrorist activities and recent violence. The ban came three days after a meeting of the AL-led 14-party alliance, chaired by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina.
The government cited evidence of Jamaat and Shibir's direct involvement in recent alleged acts of violence and destructive activities during the student protests regarding quota reform. These incidents reportedly included violent confrontations and sabotage efforts aimed at exploiting the protests. Additionally, the government accused these groups of inciting such acts to further destabilize the situation and undermine the protests' objectives.
The International Crimes Tribunal had previously held Jamaat and Shibir liable for committing genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity during the Liberation War.
Several top Jamaat leaders were sentenced to death for their crimes, and the party's registration with the Election Commission was declared illegal by the High Court in 2013, a decision later upheld by the Supreme Court.
Justice seekers and war crimes victims have long demanded the trial and banning of Jamaat. Shyamoli Nasreen Chowdhury, president of Ekattorer Ghatak Dalal Nirmul Committee, expressed relief at the ban, while demanding further measures to prevent Jamaat from re-emerging under a new banner. Prof. Anu Muhammad noted that the ban, although long-discussed, came at a politically opportune time for the government amidst ongoing protests.
Jamaat Ameer Shafiqur Rahman condemned the ban as unconstitutional and undemocratic, arguing that it violated citizens' rights to assemble and organize. He suggested that the government was attempting to divert attention from its misdeeds by blaming Jamaat for creating untoward incidents.
The ban on Jamaat and Shibir is expected to lead to a significant realignment within the political landscape. According to AFP Bureau Chief Shafiqul Alam, the ban may force younger activists and members to seek new political homes. A likely scenario is the formation of a new party with a secular name, reminiscent of Turkey's Justice and Welfare Party. This new entity could attract the younger, more progressive elements of Jamaat, eager to dissociate from the tainted legacy of the party's older leadership.
This transition could marginalize the old guard of Jamaat, who have been unable to shake off their association with the executed leaders implicated in war crimes. Consequently, this generational shift may result in a political landscape where Jamaat's historical role is less prominent, although the ideological undercurrents may persist in new forms.
Secularism and Its Contradictions in AL Politics
For the AL, the ban presents a paradox. On one hand, it underscores the party's commitment to secularism and positions it as a bulwark against extremism. On the other hand, it removes a key political tool. For decades, the AL has relied on the presence of Jamaat to rally secular forces and justify its own authoritarian measures. With Jamaat banned, the AL may struggle to find a new 'bogeyman' to blame for societal unrest and radicalism.
Moreover, the ban could backfire by galvanizing support for the newly formed political entities that emerge from the remnants of Jamaat and Shibir. These new parties could position themselves as moderate, reformist alternatives, potentially attracting voters disillusioned with the AL's heavy-handed tactics.
The ban is likely to have mixed effects on the secularization of Bangladeshi society. While it may weaken the organizational structure of radical elements, it also risks driving them underground, where they could become harder to monitor and counteract. Furthermore, the narrative of secularism vs. radicalism has been a central theme in Bangladeshi politics, deeply intertwined with the legacy of the Liberation War.
As Alam points out, much of Bangladesh's political discourse is still shaped by competing narratives of the 1971 war. The ban on Jamaat will not erase its controversial role in the war from public memory, but it may reduce the fervor of these debates.
This could lead to a political environment where historical grievances are less potent as tools for political mobilization, potentially opening space for new issues and ideologies to come to the fore.
The Awami League's embrace of secularism has been both a defining feature and a tool of political expediency. Secularism in Bangladesh is characterized by a clear division between religious and political spheres, yet this separation is often blurred by the AL itself. As noted in a New Age article, secular politics in Bangladesh should theoretically avoid any religious connotations. However, the AL has not shied away from using religious symbolism when it suits its agenda. This duality highlights a significant contradiction in the AL's approach to governance.
The AL's secularism often appears selective, targeting Islam more stringently while accommodating other religions in its public engagements. This selective secularism has allowed the AL to distance itself from Islam while fostering ties with religious groups when politically advantageous. This duality is evident in the AL's historical alliances, such as its collaboration with Jamaat during the early 1990s to dethrone the BNP.
Despite its secular claims, the AL has frequently utilized religious symbols to further its political goals. For instance, the party's election symbol, the boat, has been equated with the boat of Prophet Nuh (Noah), invoking a powerful religious image to garner support. Similarly, the AL's condemnation of the BNP as 'Azrael' or the archangel of death demonstrates how religious references are employed to delegitimize opponents.
Such tactics reveal an underlying inconsistency in the AL's secular stance. While promoting secularism as a cornerstone of its identity, the party has repeatedly resorted to religious rhetoric and alliances, reflecting an intellectual and semiotic bankruptcy as suggested by critics.
The AL's Relationship with Religion-Based Parties
The AL's relationship with religion-based parties has been marked by pragmatism rather than ideology. While publicly denouncing Jamaat as a non-secular and anti-liberation force, the AL has not hesitated to collaborate with Islamist groups when necessary. This was evident in its alliance with Jamaat during the 1991-1996 period, which played a crucial role in the AL's return to power.
In recent years, the AL's ties with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India have further highlighted this pragmatic approach. The BJP's anti-Muslim stance contrasts sharply with the AL's secular image, yet the two parties have maintained a mutually beneficial relationship. This alliance underscores the AL's willingness to compromise its secular principles for political gain.
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has expressed concerns that Jamaat and Shibir may "go underground and engage in destructive activities" after the ban, framing these groups as militant threats to national security.
This rhetoric serves to maintain the narrative of Jamaat as a perennial boogeyman, justifying stringent measures and continued surveillance.
By labeling Jamaat as a militant group, the AL reinforces its image as the protector of secularism and national security. However, this strategy also risks pushing Jamaat and its affiliates into more radical and clandestine operations, potentially exacerbating the very threats the ban aims to eliminate.
It is essential to acknowledge that much of the criticism against Jamaat is heavily influenced by AL narratives. While Jamaat's involvement in wartime atrocities is well-documented, the portrayal of the party as an existential threat to Bangladesh's secular fabric can sometimes serve the AL's political interests. This bias must be considered when evaluating the implications of the ban.
Supporters of Jamaat argue that the party represents a principled opposition to state-imposed secularism and that its historical role should not automatically justify its exclusion from the political process. However, the party's persistent association with violence and radicalism has made it difficult for Jamaat to shed its controversial image.
Takeaways
The ban on Jamaat and Shibir represents a pivotal moment in Bangladeshi politics, with potential consequences that extend beyond the immediate disbanding of these organizations. While the Awami League (AL) may celebrate this move as a triumph of secularism, the reality is more nuanced. The ban could lead to the emergence of new political entities, complicate the AL's strategic use of Jamaat as a scapegoat, and alter the dynamics of secularism and radicalism in Bangladesh.
Moreover, this political shift may have significant implications for the ongoing student movement in Bangladesh, which has been gaining momentum with each passing day. As the government implements the ban, there is a concern that it might use the situation to justify further crackdowns on the student protests.
There is a risk that authorities could seize this opportunity to arrest student leaders and protesters under the pretense that they are affiliated with Jamaat or Shibir, even if no such connections exist.
This potential misuse of power could stifle the student movement and suppress legitimate dissent.
As the political landscape shifts, it will be crucial for all stakeholders to navigate these changes carefully. Ensuring that the pursuit of secularism does not inadvertently fuel new forms of extremism or undermine the democratic process will be essential. The true impact of the Jamaat and Shibir ban, including its effect on the student movement and broader societal dynamics, will unfold over time, revealing the complexities of this bold but contentious decision.
